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Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical analysis regarding the rationality of suicide attacks from
an economist’s point of view. It is argued that although a terrorist gives up future utility
from consumption by committing a suicide attack, this loss can be overcompensated by the
utility he derives from the attack. Some individual cases of suicide bombers are presented
in order to elucidate the diversity of motivations behind the attacks.
We derive conditions under which a rational agent might decide to become a suicide
bomber – or to announce the attack and defect later. The paper shows why the decision
to commit a suicide attack can be time-inconsistent and what mechanisms might prevent
time-inconsistency. Integrating the psychological concepts of cognitive dissonance and terror
management theory into our economic analysis, we demonstrate why – although predicted
by standard economic theory – defection is a phenomenon rarely observed.
We ﬁnally present some policy implications. In the light of our analysis, policies that focus
on material well-being seem less promising than policies that address non-monetary beneﬁts
of suicide attacks. The paper concentrates on two policy strategies: oﬀering alternatives –
with respect to the aims of terrorism as well as the means to attain them – and reducing the
information bias – with respect to the availability as well as the access to information.
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Suicide attacks seem to be – at ﬁrst glance – a puzzling phenomenon for economists. When it is
assumed that an individual maximizes his intertemporal utility, how can it be optimal to forego
a large part of his future utility?
Several theories have been put forward to explain suicide missions or, more generally, terrorist
acts. Among these explanations, psychopathy and hate rank high in the public opinion. Yet,
research suggests that most terrorists are not driven by either of these causes (Silke 1998,
Weatherston/Moran 2003), but are rather attracted by the feeling of purpose and belongingness
to some peer group as well as common socio-political goals and the desire for immortality (see
Maikovich 2005, Routledge/Arndt 2008). In this paper we show that, although often stigmatized
as irrational, suicide attacks can be compatible with the actions of a rational, welfare maximizing
agent.
Our interest in this speciﬁc type of terrorism is well justiﬁed by empirical data: Although
suicide attacks made up only 3% of all terrorist incidents in the period from 1980 to 2001, they
were responsible for 48% of all related deaths (see Pape 2003). The phenomenon of people
being willing to sacriﬁce their life for some ‘higher goal’ is, however, neither new nor conﬁned to
speciﬁc religions, cultures or political convictions. From the ancient Jewish Zealots in 73 AD,
over the 11th-12th century Ismaili Assassins (see Rapoport 1984, Pape 2005) to the almost 5000
Japanese ‘kamikaze’ pilots in World War II (Laquer 1990), political or religiously motivated
suicide has been a recurrent phenomenon. Also, starting early in history, people willing to
sacriﬁce themselves have been used systematically as weapons. Especially the last two decades
have witnessed a dramatic increase in suicide attacks in countries as diverse as Lebanon, India,
Chechnya and the US (Pape 2003). Impacts may be immense as, e.g., the attack on the World
Trade Center alone killed almost 2800 people. The puzzling question is why people are willing
to go to this extreme.
By committing a suicide attack, an individual foregoes the utility from consumption subse-
quent to his premature death, yet he might derive additional utility from other, altruism related
factors, such as from having abetted the aims of a peer group which could be, e.g., his people or
denomination, possibly represented by a terrorist organization. Also the status and even mate-
rial well-being of the terrorist’s remaining family might increase due to his sacriﬁce. Terrorist
organizations foster immaterial rewards by tying the potential attacker as close as possible to
the group. Organizations like Hamas and IRA, e.g., provided public goods like health services
and social welfare (see Hilsenrath 2005, Bueno de Mesquita 2005), education (CFR 2009) or
police services (see Silke 1999). This way, the agent’s identiﬁcation with the organization and
its goals increases and the organization’s utility gains more and more weight for his own welfare
1(see also Pittel/R¨ ubbelke 2006). Beyond that, the agent might expect that the attack will turn
him into a martyr who is reverently commemorated by his peer group and family, thus awarding
him either religious or symbolic immortality (Routledge/Arndt 2008). Committing to an attack
might even raise his social status before the attack and induce anticipatory feelings of pride and
accomplishment. Last but not least, an agent who is driven by religious motives might expect
to be rewarded posthumously by some higher authority.
In contrast to utility from individual consumption, the utility derived from altruistic motives
and an increase in social status might carry weight with the agent even if they arise only after
his death. Taking all the above factors into consideration, it can indeed be rational for a person
to become a suicide bomber. In this case, the intertemporal utility of his shortened life exceeds
the utility from a life lived to its natural end.
Using the mechanisms described, terrorist organizations try to persuade individuals to be-
come suicide bombers. Governments on the other hand use the same means in order to dissuade
potential assassins. By threatening, e.g., to retaliate against a bomber’s family, they aim at
creating negative utility eﬀects that outweigh the positive eﬀects created in the bomber’s envi-
ronment.1 We will shortly discuss this and other policy options at the end of this paper.
We also deal with the question whether not only commitment to a suicide attack can be
rational but also defection at a later state. Examples for this seemingly irrational and time-
inconsistent behavior have been reported even recently.2 We show that this type of behavior is
also compatible with standard economic theory and rational agents. ‘Chickening out’ can be a
time-consistent course of action from the perspective of the individual terrorist. In this case,
the agent maximizes his utility by ﬁrst announcing to commit the attack, although he does not
plan to carry it out. In this case, the actions of the terrorist might seem to be time-inconsistent
to an outsider but do not have to be from the terrorists’ perspective.
Whether or not committing to an attack can indeed be time-inconsistent, depends on the
way the terrorist discounts the future. We compare two diﬀerent types of discounting. First we
assume constant discount rates as mostly done in economic theory. Yet, although this assumption
is fairly common, it has often been found empirically that individuals’ discount rates are not
constant over time. Rather, discounting seems to follow a hyperbolic path where payoﬀs which
are closer in time are discounted at a higher rate than payoﬀs in the distant future (see e.g.
Ainslie/Haslam 1992).3
The paper shows that time-inconsistent behavior cannot arise if discount rates are constant.
1Whether threats and retaliation constitute an eﬃcient way to combat suicide attacks is analyzed, e.g., by
Lee/Sandler (1989).
2Decisions are called time-inconsistent if an agent favors a speciﬁc payoﬀ at time t0, but this payoﬀ is not
optimal anymore when reevaluated at some point in the future.
3For these and other discounting related issues, see e.g. Loewenstein/Elster (1992).
2If however discounting is hyperbolic, time-inconsistency is conceivable. In this case an agent
perceives a future suicide mission to be utility maximizing from today’s perspective, yet not
when reconsidered at the time of the attack.
Following the results of the above analysis one could expect that potential suicide bombers
who rescind their decision are not too uncommon. That evidence of this kind of behavior is
rather scarce may of course be due to limited access to this type of information. Nevertheless,
it is also conceivable that the time-inconsistency of decisions can be overcome by psychological
processes. We show that a terrorist’s reactions to cognitive dissonance and mortality salience
might provide explanations as to why the decision to carry out a suicide attack is more often
than not put into practise.
Cognitive dissonance arises from decisions that are associated with positive as well as negative
aspects for an individual - as obviously the case for terrorism. It creates a tension that an
individual tries to reduce or eliminate by manipulating his perception of reality. As a result
costs and beneﬁts of becoming a suicide bomber are perceived diﬀerently which might aﬀect
an agent’s decision to carry out an attack. Similarly, experiments showed that an increased
mortality salience intensiﬁes people’s need for cultural identity and decreases their tolerance
towards other cultures. The readiness to defend their view of the world against others increases,
thereby paving the way for terrorism. We show that cognitive dissonance as well as mortality
salience might prevent time-inconsistent decisions.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 illustrates diﬀerent proﬁles and motivations of
terrorists using speciﬁc examples. The decision problem of a rational individual who ponders to
become a suicide bomber is then analyzed in Section 3 for the standard case of constant discount
rates. After a short discussion of the time-consistency of decisions in this scenario, Section 4
introduces the concept of hyperbolic discounting and analyzes its implications. Section 5 argues
that the theoretical results of the previous sections and the empirics on rescinded suicide attacks
might be at odds. The section demonstrates how external inﬂuences on the terrorist as well as
internal manipulation mechanisms that result from cognitive dissonance and mortality salience
can reconcile theory and empirics. Section 6 gives some policy implications and Section 7
concludes.
2 Suicide attackers - diverse proﬁles and motivations
Proﬁles of suicide attackers are very diverse as terrorists come from a variety of social, political
and religious backgrounds. Nevertheless, it seems possible to classify their motivation according
to the eﬀects that arise for them from the attack. In the following we distinguish between three
main categories:
3• posthumous eﬀects: rise in the social and monetary status of the attackers family; immor-
tality of the attacker; accomplishment of political, religious and social goals.
• announcement eﬀects: admiration and rise in status of the attacker before the attack.
• defection eﬀects: negative consequences arising in case the attacker does not carry out the
attack.
Not all of these motivations can be found for every attacker, yet some elements can almost
always be identiﬁed. In the following we provide some examples.
Let us consider the cases of two female attackers ﬁrst. According to Schweitzer (2006: 8),
in the period between 1985 and 2006 nearly 15 percent of the overall number of actual suicide
bombers around the world were female, although among some groups, e.g. Chechen rebels and
the Kurdistan Workers Party, women form a majority of the attackers (see Pape 2005).4 The
following examples show that background and motivation of female attackers are as diverse as
those of their male counterparts, yet they also show how diﬃcult and complex it can be to verify
what is driving a suicide bomber.
Wafa Idris, a 28-year-old Palestinian, detonated a bomb in a suicide attack in central
Jerusalem in January 2002, killing an Israeli and injuring dozens others. She was the ﬁrst
female suicide bomber in the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict. Victor (2003) describes her as “a tal-
ented young woman, married and divorced because she was sterile” (Victor 2003: 39). After
her divorce she “was desperate because she knew perfectly well there was no future for her in
any aspect of the Palestinian society” (Alvanou 2007: 75). It seems that due to her despair,
committing the attack was the only hope she had to escape her living conditions and to re-
store her reputation,5 although Idris’ mother claimed that her daughter’s attack was not due to
desperation (see Bennet 2002). As religious motives probably did not play a major role in her
decision – she was reported to be not particularly religious – a nationalist fervor may also have
contributed as an important impetus. Aksa Martyrs Brigades pointed to this possible motive by
stating that she died in the name of Palestine and anecdotal evidence supporting this conclusion
might be found in her social and family background: besides being an activist of the Fatah
faction, she was directly aﬄicted by the Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict as she was a resident of the
Amari refugee camp and worked as a volunteer medic with an aﬃliate of the International Red
Cross that was medicating Palestinians among which were people wounded by Israeli soldiers.
The second female example, 22-year-old Dareen Abu Aysheh, a senior student of English
Literature, detonated a bomb at an Israeli roadblock in West Ramallah and wounded four
Israelis in February 2002. She left a videotape in which she explicitly expressed that she was
4With 67 incidents, Israel and Palestinian territories are those areas second most targeted by female suicide
bombers, while Sri Lanka ranks ﬁrst with a number of 75 (Schweitzer 2006: 8).
5Ordinary suicide, i.e. suicide caused by personal distress, is expressly forbidden in Islam (Alvanou 2007: 38).
4following Idris’ footsteps. She was an active supporter of the Hamas and, like Idris, aﬀected by
the killing of Palestinians by Israeli soldiers (Greenberg 2002).
In contrast to Idris, her motivation for the attack was probably inﬂuenced by religious
considerations as she has been described as a religious person (Saloul 2003: 22). The role of her
family is ambiguous. On the one hand, she was not the only suicide attacker in her family as
a 17-year-old cousin also conducted a suicide bombing. On the other hand, her father stressed
that her action was against the will of the family. Her brother, however, stated that “[s]he was
sure that we would be killed for nothing, maybe at a roadblock or when our houses are bombed,
and she used to say that it is better to die for a reason” (Greenberg 2002). So, desperation may
also have been part of her motivation.
The examples of Idris and Abu Aysheh show that posthumous eﬀects seem to play a major
role in decisions to become suicide bombers. Yet, the composition of these eﬀects diﬀers. While
Idris’ motives seem to have been of a political and personal nature, i.e. abetting the Palestinian
cause and restoring her reputation, Abu Aysheh’s motivation was additionally inﬂuenced by
religion. The expectation that the attack would be positively regarded by their families and
increase their families’ status, could have played a role, although at least Abu Aysheh’s father’s
statement does not seem to support this.
Although not directly conﬁrmable in the above cases, the hope to attain religious or symbolic
immortality also seems to be a motivation for suicide bombers (see Routledge/Arndt 2008 and
also Section 5.2). A speciﬁc example for heavenly rewards which has become notorious among
the western media is the case of 16-year-old Hussam Bilal Abdu from Nablus. He was detained
in 2004 while wearing an explosive belt and reported that the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine promised him 70 virgins in heaven if he carried out the suicide attack (Harel/Regular
2004).
Monetary incentives for suicide attackers and their family have repeatedly been reported
from the Middle East but also other regions. Keller (2002), e.g., reports that in March 2002 the
Iraq announced a payment of $25,000 to families of suicide bombers in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip (see also Krueger/Maleckova 2003). Hassan (2001) who interviewed numerous Palestinian
militants aﬃrms that the sponsoring organization usually gave between $3,000 and $5,000 to
the bombers’ families. In 2008, Amir Qasab, one of the gunmen who attacked several targets in
Mumbai in a suicide mission, testiﬁed that the terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taibat promised
his father a £2,000 payment that could be used to run the family (McElroy 2008).6 Qasab
ultimately refused to sacriﬁce himself and reported that he now feared the worst for his family
6Whether payments to the family should in general be viewed as an additional incentive, thus inducing positive
utility to the suicide bomber, or only lessen the guilt associated with abandoning one’s family, i.e. reducing the
negative utility components of an attack, remains open to discussion, see e.g. Caplan (2006). For the subsequent
analysis, this diﬀerentiation is, however, insubstantial as both lower the threshold to commit a suicide attack.
5as he was instructed he should not return alive at any cost. Qasab’s case therefore also provides
an example for the negative eﬀects of defecting, i.e. for ways in which threats against the
attacker and his family can be used by terrorist organizations to keep terrorists in line. Another
example for this kind of deterring strategy is given by Berman/Laitin (2005) according to whom
the Tamil Tigers “used intimidation for recruitment, threatening Tamils that they would punish
relatives if they did not perform patriotic services” (Berman/Laitin 2005: 25).
In the following, we use the three types of motivation introduced and exempliﬁed in this
section to show when and under what circumstances, the decision to commit a suicide attack
might be rational for an individual.7
3 Optimal decisions under constant discounting
3.1 Decision rules
Consider an agent who is oﬀered the opportunity to commit a suicide attack at some future
date ¯ t.8 The agent can choose between three diﬀerent courses of action that result in diﬀerent
present values of utility. First, he can decide not to become a suicide bomber. Second, he can
agree to commit a suicide attack and indeed carry it out. Third, he can agree to commit the
attack, but defect before carrying it out. An agent who maximizes intertemporal utility will
choose the course of action that entails the highest present value of utility.
In case the agent decides against the attack, he derives utility from individual consumption







where ρ denotes a constant discount factor.9
In case the agent decides to become a suicide bomber, he will carry out the attack after a
planning and preparation period at time ¯ t. In this case he is only able to consume until the time







7Please note that the concept of rationality we apply follows Wintrobe (2006) who postulates “rationality just
means that, whatever the goal, a person chooses the best means to achieve it” (Wintrobe 2006: 170). For a more
comprehensive treatment of rationality concepts and terrorism, see e.g. Caplan (2006).
8For simplicity we assume that the date of the attack cannot be chosen by the agent but is set exogenously.
Also, the terrorist activity level is not modeled as a continuous variable with the maximum level being a suicide
attack (see e.g. Azam 2005). We solely consider the decision to become or not to become a suicide bomber, i.e.
a zero-one decision.
9The discount factor is given by ρ =
1
1+¯ ρ where ¯ ρ denotes the discount rate.
6Obviously, V
¯ t
0 < V T
0 holds if ¯ t < T, such that it would never be rational for the agent to commit
a suicide attack if no additional utility were derived from the attack. As already outlined above,
we assume however that the agent not only derives utility from his own consumption, but also
from his present as well as posthumous status in society, the well-being and status of his family










where U(At) is the utility an agent derives from the gain in status that follows from the an-
nouncement to participate even before the attack is carried out (announcement eﬀect).11 U(Pt)
represents the aggregate posthumous beneﬁts of his decision (post-attack eﬀects) which include
non-altruistic components such as pride from being commemorated as a martyr and ‘heavenly
rewards’ as well as altruistic components, e.g. positive eﬀects on the peer group’s goals and
the rise in family status (and potentially wealth).12 Altruistic components may also comprise
negative utility eﬀects if the terrorist cares to some extend about those killed in the attack or
worries about the family he leaves behind. In case these negative eﬀects are strong, they might
even render the aggregate posthumous utility negative.
Finally, the agent might decide at t0 not only to volunteer for the attack but also to defect
later. In this case he beneﬁts from the announcement eﬀect but foregoes the posthumous beneﬁts.
Furthermore, he is likely to suﬀer from repercussions inﬂicted by the terrorist organization which
might result in a loss of his and his family’s social and economic status and possibly even their












where U(Dt) comprises the eﬀects from defection (defection eﬀect).
The agent now compares the utility arising from each of the three alternatives. Comparing
(1) and (3) shows that the agent commits to the mission if the announcement and post-attack
10For simplicity, we set these non-consumptive utility components to zero for the case that the agent does not
engage in the attack. Yet, we admit that in some cases, this assumption might not reﬂect reality. Take Idris,
the ﬁrst female Palestinian suicide attacker (see Section 2), for example: Her utility without the attack might
be reduced by a bad reputation – due to divorce and sterility – and the shame caused to her family. We could
model these eﬀects but refrain from doing so, as it would render the disposition more complicated without adding
insight about the mechanisms at work. We will, however, come back to this issue in the policy section (Section
6).
11For simplicity we assume the consumption at each point in time, Ct, to be independent of the attack decision.
12Azam (2005) follows a similar reasoning by employing the dynastic family hypothesis and linking the terrorist
to his descendants by some altruism parameter.
7eﬀects outweigh foregone future consumption:
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where it should be noted that even in absence of altruistic motives, a rational agent might decide
to become a suicide bomber if announcement eﬀect and non-altruistic posthumous eﬀects are
suﬃciently large.
From the comparison of (3) and (4), we see that the agent honestly commits to a suicide
attack rather than defects if
V ∞











i.e. if the posthumous eﬀects overcompensate the loss of utility from foregone consumption net
of the defection eﬀect. So, even if the agent feels strongly about the harm he going to cause
(U(Pt) < 0), it might be optimal for him to carry out the attack given that the defection eﬀects
are aggravating enough. The announcement eﬀect does not appear in (6) as the agent receives
announcement beneﬁts independent of whether he eventually commits the attack.
Finally, in case that the utility from not volunteering as well as the utility from defecting
are larger than the utility from the attack (V ∞
0 < V T
0 and V ∞
0 < V D
0 ), the agent has to assess
whether defecting or not volunteering at all is the better choice. An agent decides in favor of
defection if the announcement eﬀect is larger than the utility lost due to defection:
V D








Summing up, it can be optimal for a rational agent to commit a suicide attack as well as to
defect. Yet, as we will show in the next subsection, in case the terrorist defects at ¯ t, he already
decides to do so at t0. The above analysis can not account for terrorists for whom committing
the attack is optimal initially but later becomes suboptimal. This type of time-inconsistent
behavior cannot be explained under constant discount rates.
3.2 Time-consistency of the decision
First consider the decision between commitment and defection, i.e. (3) and (4). (6) shows that
this decision – regardless of the time of the decision – solely depends on beneﬁts accruing at
t ≥ ¯ t. Consequently, a decision which was made at t0 will still be optimal at t = ¯ t and is
therefore time-consistent.
In case an agent decides against any involvement in the attack, the question arises whether
he might regret his decision later. Comparing (1) and (3) as well as (1) and (4), not participating
8will still be optimal if13
V T













ρtU(D¯ t+t) > 0. (9)
Obviously the latter condition is always fulﬁlled as long as there are any repercussions from
defecting. From (8) it follows that if not committing to the attack was optimal at t0, it will still
be optimal at ¯ t. As the decision at t0 against the attack implied V T
0 > V ∞
0 and we know that
V ∞
0 > V ∞
¯ t , it follows straightforwardly that the initial decision is time-consistent. If, however,
the agent decided to commit the attack in t0 (i.e. V T
0 < V ∞
0 ) but not to defect (i.e. V ∞
0 > V D
0 ),
he might regret this decision later if V ∞
¯ t < V T
¯ t . Nevertheless, he will still carry out the attack, as
he already determined at t0 that defecting is suboptimal for him and V ∞
0 −V D
0 = V ∞
¯ t −V D
¯ t > 0
holds.
So, we have seen that under constant discounting decisions are always time-consistent. Yet,
when observing last minute defection in reality, this result does not seem entirely convincing.
It can hardly account for cases in which a terrorist lets himself being rigged with the bomb
and then does not pull the trigger. We will show, however, that this type of time-inconsistent
behavior can be explained when giving up the assumption of constant discount rates.
4 Optimal decisions under hyperbolic discounting
Standard economic theory assumes – as we have done so far – that the rate at which individuals
discount the future is constant over time. This assumption is fairly popular in dynamic economic
theory as it not only facilitates the analysis but, as conﬁrmed above, also results in time-
consistent decisions. Empirical studies have, however, shown (see Ainslie 1992, Laibson et
al. 1998) that individuals regularly apply lower discount rates to events in the distant future
compared to events which are closer in time.14 Under this type of discounting, also referred
13To be better able to compare (5) and (8), resp. (7) and (9), we discounted the present value of utility at t = ¯ t









































The same holds for the derivation of (15) and (17).
14A typical example for this kind of behavior is the following: An agent who can choose between a gift of 10
Euro today or 10.50 Euro tomorrow chooses 10 Euro today. Given the choice, however, between 10 Euro in 365
9to as hyperbolic discounting, decisions are not necessarily time-consistent anymore. As Ainslie
(1991) puts it, hyperbolic preferences can constitute “a major obstacle to rational planning[, as]
any plan requiring a prolonged course of action will fail unless the person can arrange consistent
motivation for or binding commitment to it” (Ainslie 1991: 334).
Several forms of hyperbolic discounting have been proposed in the literature. We employ
one of the simplest notions (which has sometimes also been referred to as quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, see Harris/Laibson 2001) since it simpliﬁes the exposition but suﬃces to make our
point. Compared to the previous section, quasi-hyperbolic discounting modiﬁes the individual’s
discount factors from δt to βδt with 0 < β ≤ 1. (1), (3) and (4) consequently read
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where the additional superscript h refers to the hyperbolic discounting scenario. Setting β = 1
replicates the constant discounting case.
From (10) to (12) we see that multiplying by β induces an decrease of the ﬁrst period’s
discount factor from δ to βδ. So, the relative weight of U(C1) to U(C0) is βδ while the relative
weight of any other combination of U(Ct+1) and U(Ct), t ≥ 1, is δ. Consequently, the agent’s
discount rate is initially higher than in the long run.
Now assume that it is optimal for an agent to truthfully announce at t0 that he plans to
carry out the attack, i.e. V ∞
h > V T
h and V ∞
h > V D
h . In this case
V ∞h
























¯ t[U(C¯ t)−U(D¯ t)−U(P¯ t)]. (14)
It can now be shown that the initial decision to carry out the attack might not be optimal when
reevaluated at the time of the attack. At ¯ t, (14) modiﬁes to
V ∞h








¯ t[U(C¯ t) − U(D¯ t) − U(P¯ t)]
β
. (15)
days or 10.50 Euro in 366 days, he chooses the 10.50 Euro. While this behavior is not compatible with discounting
at a constant rate, it is perfectly in line with hyperbolic discounting. Empirically, hyperbolic discounting is well-
documented and has, e.g., been employed in the analysis of addictive behavior (see O’Donoghue/Rabin 1999,
Gruber/Koszegi 2001).
10As β < 1 the RHS of (14) is smaller than the RHS of (15). Given that both conditions hold,
the agent’s initial decision will still be optimal. If, however, (14) holds while (15) does not hold,
the agent will revise his decision and defect in spite of his former honest commitment to the
attack. In this case hyperbolic discounting induces time-inconsistent behavior. (Please note
that an agent who chose defection over carrying the attack out, never regrets this decision as in
this case RHS(15)>RHS(14) > LHS(14)).
Let us now consider an agent who decides in t0 not to become a suicide bomber which means
that either V Th
0 > V ∞h
0 > V Dh
0 or V Th
0 > V Dh
0 > V ∞h
0 . Rewriting (13), the former ranking
implies
V Th
















while for the initial decision to still be optimal at t = ¯ t
V Th








¯ t[U(P¯ t) − U(C¯ t)]
β
(17)
has to hold. Consequently, if RHS(17) exceeds RHS(16), the agent might regret that he committed
against the attack. He can, however, not act time-inconsistently in this case. This would
require to carry out the attack immediately and without any planning which we assumed to be
impossible. Yet, even if the agent got another chance to commit to an attack at 2¯ t, he would
again decide against the attack (given his utility proﬁle remains the same) – although he just
regretted his decision.
Finally, an agent who initially decided in favor of defection compared to non-involvement
will always regret this decision at the time of the attack, as his additional utility from defecting
is negative.15 Yet, as he already announced that he would commit the attack, non-involvement
is not an option anymore. On the other hand, as we have seen above, it can never be optimal for
a terrorist to switch from a defecting to a carrying-out strategy at ¯ t. So, an agent who decided
to defect in t0 will always act time-consistently.
5 Perception and manipulation of costs and beneﬁts
Following the line of reasoning above, one should expect a number of potential suicide attackers
to refrain from the attack they originally agreed to. A look at the empirical data shows that
indeed a few incidents have been reported in which terrorists changed their mind, sometimes in
the virtually last second:
15Vice versa, an agent who initially chose non-involvement over defecting will never regret it at ¯ t.
11• In November 2008 gunmen attacked several targets in Mumbai. One of the gunmen was
captured and in the subsequent interrogations he provided information to the police. He
reported that he was ordered to kill until the last breath (Siddique 2008). Yet, instead he
pretended to be dead in order to survive.
• In January 2008 two terrorists strapped with explosives stormed a ﬁve-star hotel in Kabul
ﬁring automatic riﬂes. While one of these men detonated his bomb, the second attacker
ﬁnally took oﬀ his bomb vest and hid (Fairweather 2008).
• In March 2004, Hussam Bilal Abdu from Nablus was arrested carrying an explosive belt
(see also Section 2). He was judged to be “a bit of a loser, a messed-up adolescent in search
of respect and fame among his peers” (Kiley 2004). Yet, when he was spotted by Israeli
soldiers he complained that he does not want to die.
The question arises, why these incidents are not reported more often. Of course, it lies in the
nature of the subject that data on this kind of behavior is rather scarce, yet it is also conceivable
that there exist forces which prevent the potential suicide attacker from reversing his decision.
These forces might be external in the sense that events or actions taken by people around the
terrorist make him more unlikely to defect. Besides these external forces, the power of internal
mechanisms should, however, not be underestimated. With internal mechanisms we mean self-
enforcing processes that can, e.g., be caused by the desire to reduce cognitive dissonance or
anxiety in the face of death.
5.1 External manipulation forces
How an agent perceives the costs and beneﬁts of an attack depends to a large extend on his
environment – ex ante as well as ex post of his decision. Terrorists’ peer groups, terrorist
organizations as well as entities countering terrorism employ a variety of diﬀerent manipulation
methods in order to convince a terrorist of the attack and keep him from defecting.
External manipulation by a terrorist organization could, e.g., include to raise the threat level
associated with defection, U(Dt). In the extreme, the threat could be made to kill the agent
for his defection. In this case, he would not live to enjoy any private utility after defecting and
even an inﬁnitesimally small positive posthumous utility, U(Pt), would be suﬃcient to make
him commit the attack. A second option would be to increase posthumous utility, U(Pt), by
promises to the assassins’ family and by raising the expectation of heavenly joys.16
Extremist organizations can furthermore manipulate their members’ beliefs by keeping them
in company only of others who share the desired beliefs (Hardin 2002). In the case of terrorists,
16Please note that it cannot be eﬀective for a terrorist organization, which strives to prevent defection, to
increase, U(At). As a higher U(At) not only increases the pay-oﬀ from the attack but also the pay-oﬀ from
defection, it does not render defection less likely.
12isolation reduces the access to balanced information in favor of information that emphasizes
positive eﬀects of the attack and thereby promotes the organizations goals.17 The terrorist starts
to perceive people outside his group as hostile which reduces the negative utility associated with
killing or hurting them and thereby raises U(Pt). Restricting access to information might also
make the individual perceive that extreme violence is indeed the only eﬀective way to promote
the interests of his peer group. In addition, isolation in the group makes the impact of positive
announcement eﬀects, U(At), more pronounced.
Summing up, terrorist organization’s manipulation aims to aﬀect all utility components
related to the attack, i.e. it strives to rise announcement, posthumous as well as defection
eﬀects. Employing these tactics ex ante helps to tip the scale in favor of the terrorist attack
even if agents are rational. Artiﬁcially creating imperfect information by denying access to
comprehensive information and only allowing for biased or false information prevents the agent
to attain his ﬁrst-best optimum. He maximizes his utility under the information restriction
and is left with the second-best. While he might have decided against a suicide attack in the
ﬁrst-best world, he might ﬁnd it optimal in the second-best. To make it optimal for him to stick
to this decision it is vital for the terrorist organization to keep up isolation in order to prevent
the agent from re-evaluating the attack based on new information.
5.2 Internal manipulation mechanisms
Internal – in contrast to external – manipulation mechanisms and their role for decision processes
of suicide attackers have to far rarely (an exception to the rule is Pittel/R¨ ubbelke 2010) been
considered by the economics’ literature of terrorism. Yet, as we have seen, the decision to become
a terrorist depends to a large extend on non-material utility components whose perception and
evaluation seem to be even more susceptible to manipulation than preferences for material goods.
This papers aims to close the existing gap in the literature by demonstrating the importance
of internal mechanisms for not only the decision to become a suicide attacker, but also for the
predicted time-inconsistency of this decision under realistic discounting assumptions.
In the following we focus on two aspects of the interaction between psychological and eco-
17Isolation eﬀorts of this type can be found throughout history and as early as in the Assassins or Ismailis-
Nizari period (1090-1275). The Assassins seized several scattered and impregnable mountain fortresses as retreat
centres for their movement (see also Rapoport 1984). Comtemporary examples include Al Qaeda who encourages
the training of its supporters in hidden military camps that “generate both the common collective identity and
the shared tactics and repertoires that have informed the transnational cells” (Leheny 2005: 100). Hegghammer
(2006: 46) stresses the crucial role of training camps in “violence acculturization, indoctrination, training and
relations-building.” Aum Shinrikyo who committed the Tokyo sarin attack in 1995 constructed nuclear shelters
and communes where its members were separated from their families and children received no formal schooling
(Pittel/R¨ ubbelke 2006).
13nomic sphere: cognitive dissonance and mortality salience.18
Cognitive dissonance
Cognitive dissonance arises when two implications of an action have opposing eﬀects (Festinger
1957). This dissonance creates a tension within an individual’s mind that “gives rise to pressures
to reduce or eliminate the dissonance” (Festinger 1957: 18), i.e. agents will form their beliefs
and manipulate their perception of reality in order to reduce the tension. According to Dickens
(1986), psychological studies suggest that agents systematically alter their beliefs to convince
themselves that their decisions are correct and thereby reduce their ‘psychic costs’ (Cameron
1988). They will, for example, select their sources of information in favor of those sources
that conﬁrm their desired beliefs, respectively those beliefs that support decisions already taken
(Akerlof/Dickens 1982).19Suicide attacks naturally induce cognitive dissonance. On the one
hand, they are associated with strong negative (dissonant) cognitions as not only the lives of
others but especially one’s own life is lost. On the other hand positive (consonant) cognitions
arise from the feeling that one serves the goals of his peer group, attains glory and perhaps
also leaves one’s family better oﬀ. Maikovich (2005: 377) argues that “what diﬀerentiates the
few who do become terrorists from the majority who do not is often the ability to reduce this
cognitive dissonance”.
The need to reduce cognitive dissonance arises mainly after the decision to become a suicide
bomber has been made, although ex ante manipulation is also conceivable. In the latter case an
agent manipulates his cognitions to strengthen those beliefs which are in favor of the preferred
outcome. Jonas et al. (2003) stress that a conﬁrmation bias is not restricted to situations in
which a ﬁnal decision has already been made. They argue that “a similar bias arises after pre-
liminary decisions (preference judgments) if the decision maker feels committed to the preferred
alternative” (Jonas et al. 2003: 1183). Nevertheless, ex ante manipulation only serves to justify
a decision which would be preferred anyway. So, in spite of ex ante manipulation, the agent
takes the decision that maximizes his welfare.
What about the situation after the decision? Cognitive dissonance in the form of costs and
beneﬁts of the decision are still present and the agent will strive to mitigate the dissonance in
order to experience a higher level of utility. Once agreed to the suicide attack, he will search for
information justifying his decision, thus creating a conﬁrmation bias (see e.g Jonas et al. 2003
and references within). He might even choose not to be exposed to diﬀerent views and seek the
18For a more comprehensive review of psychological approaches to terrorism see Victoroﬀ (2005).
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14seclusion oﬀered by terrorist groups.20
In case future costs and beneﬁts are discounted at a constant rate, this ex-post self-manipula-
tion has no eﬀect except for conﬁrming decisions already made. In case of hyperbolic discounting,
however, it might solve the time-inconsistency problem.
Recall that time-inconsistency arises when the discrepancy between short- and long-run
discounting renders a diﬀerent decision optimal at the time of the attack than at the time of the
initial decision. For the attack to be optimal at t = 0, (14) has to hold, while (15), i.e.
∞ X
¯ t+1




¯ t[U(C¯ t) − U(D¯ t) − U(P¯ t)]
β
.
has to hold at the time of the attack. Time-inconsistency arises if (14) but not (15) holds.
Aversion of cognitive dissonance makes time-inconsistency less likely to arise, as the agent per-
ceives U(Pt) and U(Dt), the posthumous and defection eﬀects, stronger than before while he
downplays the utility of foregone consumption, U(Ct)). This implies that the LHS of (15) rises
while the RHS falls. An agent who might regret his decision when cognitive dissonance is not
taken into account, might stick to it due to self-manipulation.
So, taking cognitive dissonance mitigating processes into account might explain why – al-
though experiments support the hyperbolic discounting hypothesis – not many terrorists seem
to rescind their commitment to a suicide attack. Of course, the described eﬀects of cognitive
dissonance do not arise exclusively in the extreme case of suicide attacks, they are present when-
ever a decision creates opposing cognitions. The case of suicide attacks is, however, special as
it involves to come to terms with one’s own death, i.e. it increases mortality salience which in
turn aﬀects the utility agents derive from suicide attacks.
Mortality Salience
The psychological eﬀects caused by the fear that follows from mortality salience are addressed
by terror management theory (TMT).21 According to TMT, becoming aware of death fosters
the need to defend one’s worldview and increases negative reactions to those who threaten this
view.22 It is argued that the cultural worldview provides protection from the ‘existential’ fear of
20For overviews of empirical studies that provide evidence for a conﬁrmation bias see Frey (1986) and Frey et
al. (1996).
21TMT builds on the theoretical works of Greenberg et al. (e.g. Greenberg et al. 1986, 1997). It was tested
and conﬁrmed by a large number of empirical studies, for an overview see, e.g., Solomon et al. (2004). In spite
of its name, terror management theory is a psychological concept which roots are unrelated to terrorism theory,
but whose implications can be very relevant to explaining the time-consistency of decisions to commit terrorist
attacks.
22“The cultural worldview is deﬁned as a set of beliefs about the nature of reality shared by groups of individuals
15death. Consequently, an increase in the awareness of death “intensiﬁes the desire to pursue faith
in the individual’s cultural worldview, its meaning, order, and stability” (Jonas et al. 2003:
1181). The increased importance of an unchallenged worldview also increases the desire for
cognitive consistency such that the conﬁrmation bias in the selection of information becomes
more pronounced. Reducing information that calls one’s worldview into question, has been
shown to increase one’s self-esteem and thereby reduce anxieties (see Jonas et al. 2003).
In terms of utility, mortality salience increases the beneﬁts an individual derives from abet-
ting the goals of his peer group by committing a suicide attack. It furthermore reduces the
feeling of guilt towards victims of the attack as it implicitly justiﬁes decisions to defend one’s
worldview with drastic means. Both eﬀects raise the utility which a terrorist derives from the
posthumous eﬀects, U(Pt). Depending on whether mortality salience increases mainly before
or after t0, its eﬀects diﬀer. If considering the attack already rises mortality salience, a com-
mitment to the attack becomes more likely while the potential for time-inconsistency remains
unaﬀected. If, however, mortality salience rises chieﬂy after the agent agreed to the attack, it
makes time-inconsistent behavior less likely as U(Pt) in (15) is perceived to be higher than U(Pt)
in (14). It seems fair to assume that both, contemplation of a suicide attack (at t ≤ 0) and the
potential certainty of death (after t > 0), aﬀect mortality salience.
So far, we have argued that considering a suicide attack increases mortality salience. Yet,
mortality salience might also raise the individual’s readiness to commit a suicide attack. Rout-
ledge/Arndt (2008) show that awareness of death raises the willingness to self-sacriﬁce in order
to secure some kind of religious or symbolic immortality.23 Contemplating a suicide attack
consequently bears signs of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy: thinking about an attack raises mortality
salience and mortality salience raises the willingness to commit an attack. Speaking in terms of
costs and beneﬁts, mortality salience raises the utility individuals derive from the expectation
of immortality, i.e. it increases the non-altruistic components of U(Pt).
6 Policy implications
As research in the last decades has shown, policy advise in the face of terrorism and especially
suicide terrorism is diﬃcult. Seemingly straightforward means to combat terrorism like providing
education or reducing poverty have in many cases been unsuccessful as “suicide bombers are at
least as likely to come from economically advantaged families and have a relatively high level of
education as to come from the ranks of the economically disadvantaged and uneducated.” (see
that provides meaning, order, permanence, stability, and the promise of literal and/or symbolic immortality to
those who live up to the standards of value set by the worldview.” (Jonas et al. 2003: 1182).
23In their paper, Routledge and Arndt conﬁrm by experiments that English citizen’s willingness to die for their
country rises with mortality salience.
16Krueger/Maleckova 2003: 141).24
Our paper supports the view that suicide attackers are driven to a large extend by non-
monetary motivations. So, policies that battle terrorism should target especially non-monetary
motives for suicide attacks. In the following we will concentrate on some counter-terrorism
measures that seem promising in the light of the preceding discussion. They can be classiﬁed
along two lines: First, to provide alternatives to suicide attackers, and, second, to combat the
information bias.
Providing alternatives can and has to encompass a variety of issues since, as we have seen
above, better living standards alone will not solve the problem. Krueger and Maleckova (2003)
stress that terrorism should rather be seen as an answer to political conditions and feelings of
indignity and frustration. Consequently, providing alternatives should start with battling these
conditions and feelings. Section 2 showed that terrorism is often born from desperation and
the conviction that committing a terrorist act is the only means left to overcome this despair.
Policies should therefore try and break-up societal structures that foster no-way-out situations
– as was the case for Idris, the divorced Palestinian suicide attacker. Also, the importance of
dialogue between parties involved in terrorism causing conﬂicts becomes clear in this context
as it constitutes an important means to reduce no-way-out feelings. In terms of the above
introduced beneﬁts from terrorism, no-way-out situations tend to raise U(At) and U(Pt) and
lower the utility attached to a life without the attack. In the face of no other option, committing
the attack becomes more important and is easier to justify. Consequently, a change for the better
resulting from the attack is valued higher and so are the terrorists who carry out the attack.
Alternatives to terrorist organizations should also be provided in the context of social services
as health care and education. As elaborated before, organizations like Hamas and IRA provide
social services and thereby induce consonant cognitions which render services to the terrorist
organization more valuable (i.e. in our model: increase of U(At) and U(Pt)). Policy maker
should strive to reduce these consonant cognitions by either oﬀering alternative services or
supporting moderate groups in providing them.
One policy program that takes the above aspects into account was set up in, e.g., Saudi
Arabia. The program al-Munasahah provides psychological and sociological counseling as well
as religious dialogue in order to encourage imprisoned terrorist supporters “to renounce their
radical ideology” (Ansary 2008: 118). By assisting prisoners and their families with education,
health care and ﬁnding employment, the program aims to show ways out of desperation and to
provide alternative life perspectives to terrorists.25
24Schellenbach (2006) furthermore argues that raising income through, e.g., foreign aid and thereby “increasing
opportunity costs of terrorism may be understood as an indirect reward for terrorist activity” in the long run
(Schellenbach 2006: 305).
25Although there have been reports on participants of this program returning to terrorist groups, the all-over
17Especially relevant in the context of suicide attacks is also to decrease mortality salience.
Living under conditions that are bound to increase mortality salience fosters suicide attacks –
as corroborated by the statement of the second female suicide attacker Abu Aysheh (see Section
2). Also, counter-terrorism policies should try to provide alternatives to attain immortality.
Routledge/Arndt (2008) show that the willingness to sacriﬁce oneself in the face of mortality
salience decreases when alternative ways to achieve immortality are available. In terms of our
model, the posthumous utility from the attack would decrease and render a decision in favor of
the attack less likely.
A second policy recommendation following from this paper would be to decrease the in-
formation bias to which potential suicide attackers are either subjected by others or subject
themselves. Regarding the external information bias, policy makers should attempt to make it
harder for terrorist organizations to isolate their members and thereby restrict their access to
information. One option would be to battle the information bias present in the mass media of
some countries. According to Haddad/Khashan (2002: 825), “[t]he mass media and other agents
of socialization in Arab and Muslim lands never cease telling their publics that the Western-led
United States is largely responsible for their debacle.” Increasing the access to and number of
news providers could be one way to improve the dissemination of less-biased information (see
Faria/Arce M. 2005).
Attempts to ﬁght internal dissonance-reducing information biases should follow the same
lines. Subjecting agents to more unbiased information makes it harder for them to ignore
dissonance causing information. The Quilliam Foundation, e.g. – a self-proclaimed counter-
extremism think-tank (Quilliam Foundation 2009) – focuses speciﬁcally on fostering moderate
islam and thereby tries to provide an alternative world view based on muslim tradition (The
Guardian 2008).
Increasing access to information is, however, not the only means to combat terrorism by
increasing cognitive dissonance. Policies could address any (self-) delusional strategies that aim
at either increasing consonant or reducing dissonant cognitions – or their respective importance.
Maikovich (2005) presents a list of worldview relevant conditions which contribute to reducing
the cognitive dissonance caused by the decision to become a terrorist. Among these are a lack
of legal means to achieve change, a ‘good vs evil view’ of the world and the perception of
society as illegitimate and unjust – to name a few (Maikovich 2005: 380). Policies that succeed
in ameliorating any part of this ‘black-and-white’ perception of the world will contribute to
ﬁghting terrorism.
performance of the program seems to be good: a program oﬃcial announced that ”only nine of the 700 released,
following the rejection of radical and deviant views, have returned to their previous ideologies” (Ansary 2008:
121).
18Beyond the worldview of terrorists, it is also the extent of media attention that determines
the information bias and deﬁnes the beneﬁts of terrorism. More media attention implies more
success in drawing attention to one’s cause, but also means more fame for the attacker – both
of which increase the posthumous utility attainable from an attack. In order to mitigate the
publicity of terrorist action, it is important to derogate the symbiotic relationship between
terrorism and the media. As Rohner/Frey (2007: 142) point out: “There is a common-interest-
game, whereby both the media and terrorists beneﬁt from terrorist incidents and where both
parties adjust their actions according to the actions of the other player.” Among the policy
recommendations Rohner/Frey (2007: 142) make, are the avoidance of attributing terrorist
attacks to particular groups and the subsidization of high quality journalism. In this context,
broadcasting videotapes in which the terrorist quasi oﬃcially announce their attack is of special
importance as these videotapes not only increase the fame of the attacker but may also serve as
a commitment device designed to reduce defecting.
7 Conclusions
This paper aimed at providing some theoretical rationale as to why the decision to become a
suicide bomber might be rational from an economist’s point of view. It argued that although a
terrorist forfeits his future utility from consumption by committing an attack, this loss might be
overcompensated by the utility he derives from the attack. Non-monetary beneﬁts from pride,
an increased social status of the attacker and his family, immortality and possibly even monetary
beneﬁts the family receives posthumously from the terrorist organization might well outweigh
the foregone utility from consumption. We demonstrated the diﬀerent types of motivation of
suicide bombers as well as the diversity of their proﬁles by analyzing some individual cases.
We then derived conditions under which a rational agent might decide to become a suicide
attacker – or to announce the attack and defect later. It was shown under which circumstances
the decision to commit a suicide attack can be time-inconsistent and what mechanisms might
prevent time-inconsistency. Integrating the psychological concepts of cognitive dissonance and
terror management theory into our economic analysis, we demonstrated why – although pre-
dicted by standard economic theory – defection is a phenomenon rarely observed. As individuals
try to reduce the cognitive dissonance associated with the decision to commit a suicide attack,
they select biased information that supports their decision to commit an attack. This reduces
the perceived costs and increases the perceived beneﬁts from an attack, making defection less
likely. Terror management theory argues that a higher awareness of death increases the need to
reduce cognitive dissonance and thereby raises the perceived beneﬁts of terrorism even further.
As desperation and no-way-out situations foster the awareness of death, it is straightforward
19that a higher readiness for self-sacriﬁce can be observed in many crisis regions. We argue that
once the decision to become a suicide bomber is made, the certainty of death even fortiﬁes the
terror management eﬀects.
We closed by presenting some policy implications. In the light of our analysis, policies that
focus on material well-being seem less promising than policies that address the non-monetary
beneﬁts of suicide attacks. The paper concentrated on two policy strategies: oﬀering alternatives
(with respect to the aims of terrorism as well as the means to attain them) and reducing the
information bias (with respect to the availability as well as the access to information).
Our analysis focused largely on the drivers of suicide attacks in the sphere of the individual
attacker, although we also considered inﬂuence mechanisms employed by the terrorist organiza-
tion or leaders. In order to get a more comprehensive view, future analysis should encompass
the sphere and motives of terrorist leaders. Developing policies that address these motives may
open up further options to counter suicide-terrorism.
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